Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1990

T.E. Wherry, T.E. Wherry, Jr., James I. Wherry,
Anita I. Wherry, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffery E. Jenson,
Sean D. Jenson, and Jessica A. Jensen v. Wesley F.
Sine and Melva Sine : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Dean H. Becker; Attorney for Appellants.
Clark W. Sessions; Michael T. Roberts; Campbell Maack & Sessions; Attorneys for Appellees.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Wherry v. Sine, No. 900406 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2781

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE .UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
T.E. WHERRY, T.E. WHERRY, JR.,
JAMES I. WHERRY, custodian,
ANITA I. WHERRY, custodian,
GAYLE W. JENSEN, JEFFREY E.
JENSEN, custodian, SEAN D.
JENSEN, custodian, and JESSICA
A. JENSEN, custodian,

Case No. 900406-CA

Plaintiffs and Appellees,

Argument Priority
Classification 16

vs.
WESLEY F. SINE and MELVA SINE,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES
On appeal from District Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY, District Judge
CLARK W. SESSIONS
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA, #400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellees
DEAN H. BECKER
349 South 200 East, #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 8411.1
Attorney for Appellants

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
T.E. WHERRY, T.E. WHERRY, JR.,
JAMES I. WHERRY, custodian,
ANITA I. WHERRY, custodian,
GAYLE W. JENSEN, JEFFREY E.
JENSEN, custodian, SEAN D.
JENSEN, custodian, and JESSICA
A. JENSEN, custodian,

Case No. 900406-CA
Argument Priority
Classification 16

Plaintiffs and Appellees,
vs.
WESLEY F. SINE and MELVA SINE,
Defendants and Appellants.
BRIEF OF APPELLEES

On appeal from District Court of Salt Lake County
Honorable MICHAEL R. MURPHY, District Judge
CLARK W. SESSIONS
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
FIRST INTERSTATE PLAZA, #400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Appellees
DEAN H. BECKER
349 South 200 East, #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Appellants

LISTING OF ALL PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
IN THE DISTRICT COURT
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure,

the

parties

to

the

action

in

the

District

Court

captioned T.E. Wherry, T.E. Wherry, Jr., James I, Wherry, custodian, Anita I, Wherry, custodian, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey E. Jensen,
custodian,

Sean D.

Jensen, custodian,

and

Jessica

A.

Jensen,

custodian v. Wesley F. Sine and Melva Sine, Civil No. 880907336, in
Salt Lake County are as follows:
Plaintiffs:
T.E, Wherry, T.E, Wherry, Jr., James I. Wherry, custodian, Anita I. Wherry, custodian, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey
E. Jensen, custodian, Sean D. Jensen, custodian, and
Jessica A. Jensen, custodian
Defendants:
Wesley F. Sine and Melva Sine

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES . . ,

1

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE .

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

SUMMARY OF APPELLEES

ARGUMENT

. . . . .

6

ARGUMENT
I.

8
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERC _
DISCR
f
IN FINDING T.E, WHERRY S TESTIMONY CREDIBLE
A.

B,

. . .

I t is the Trial Court's Discretion to
Determine the Weight or Credibility of a
Witness ,
,
, . ,

8

The Sines Fail to Show that the Trial
Court Abused its Discretion in Finding
Wherry's Testimony Credible . . . . . .

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT WHERRY
EMPLOYED HIS BEST EFFORTS AS REQUIRED BY THE
STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT

11

Standard of Review is "Clearly
Erroneousff . , . . . . . , ,

r

8

n

""ll'tie Sines F"a11 to Marshal the Evidei ice

....

The Sines Fail to Address the Court's
Finding that they Knowingly Waived any
Claim Regarding the Failure of Wherry T s
Performance Under the Stock Purchase
Agreement

. . .

Trial Court Did Not Err in Determining
That Wherry Used His Best Efforts

CONCLUSION

i

°

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
B.R. Woodward Marketing v. Collins Food,
754 P.2d 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

14

Barnes v. Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

14

Bloor v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F.Supp. 258,
267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), a f f d , 601 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1979)
Copper State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance &

. .

17

Furn. Co., 770 P. 2d 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)

12

Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) . . . .

16

Hanover Ltd. v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977)

15

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430 (1983)

14

Joyce Beverages of N.Y., Inc. v. Royal
Crown Cola, 555 F.Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58 (Utah 1987)

17
9

NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C. v. Bridgewater Steam Power,
740 F.Supp. 1140, 1151 (W.D.N.C. 1990)
Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 P.2d 1068 (Utah 1985)
State v. Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984)
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) . . . .
State v. Walker, 743 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1987)
Triple-A Baseball Club Assoc, v. Northeastern
Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 (1st Cir. 1987),
cert, denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 1111,
99 L.Ed.2d 272 (1988)
Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt A s s o c ,
584 F.2d 1164 (2d Cir. 1978)

17, 18
13
8
12, 13
12

16-18
17, 18

RULES
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a)
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 (1991)
ii

9, 12
1

ADDENDA
1.

District Court's Judgment, dated April 2, 1990.

2*

District Court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

3.

Stock Purchase Agreement.

iii

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Jurisdiction over this case is vested in this Court pursuant
to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure Rule 3 (1991).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1.

Did th& trial

court give proper weight

to

appellee

Wherryf s testimony?
2.

Did th% trial court properly find that Wherry used his

"best efforts" tQ> obtain an extension of a lease on behalf of
appellants?
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellee T.§. wherry and the other appellees commenced this
action on November 10, 1988 against appellants Wesley F. Sine and
Melva Sine.

Appellees sought damages from the Sines for their

default and breach of a Stock Purchase Agreement.
Purchase Agreement, attached as Addendum 3).

(See Stock

The trial court

later granted appellees' motion to amend their Complaint to name
Jerry Sine and DQris Sine as additional defendants following the
dismissal of their bankruptcy filing.

On July 17, 1989, Wesley

and Melva Sine and Jerry and Doris Sine answered the Amended
Complaint and asserted as a defense that T.E. Wherry failed to

use his

"best efforts"

to obtain

a lease

eictension

on

their

behalf.

A counterclaim was also filed on the grounds that T.E.

Wherry failed to use his "best efforts."
A bench tri^l was held on March 2 and March 7 of 1990. In
his opening remarks, appellees1 counsel informed the trial court
1

that appellees were proceeding only against Wesley F. and Melva
Sine since counsel understood that Jerry and Dora Sine had filed
their second bankruptcy petition and therefore the action against
them was stayed pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code,
Following trial, the court entered a Judgement on April 2,
1990, in favor of appellees.

The court ordered that appellees

recover from Wesley F. Sine and Melva Sine $162,964.63, plus
attorneys fees and costs.

The court also dismissed with preju-

dice the Sines' counterclaim.

(See District Court's Judgment,

attached as Addendum 1). From that final judgment, the Sines
appealled.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On March 31, 1961, T.E. Wherry ("Wherry"), who is now
eighty-four years of age, and his now deceased wife, Lucile M.
Wherry, entered into a ten-year lease agreement with Skaggs
Properties, Inc. for a building known as the Wasatch Bowling
Lanes in the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Salt Lake City.
9-12).

(T.

The building was eventually purchased from Skaggs Proper-

ties, Inc. prior to the lapse of the ten-year lease by Richard L.
Skankey, owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center.

(T. 76-77).

On May 4, 1971, Skankey and Wherry extended the lease agreement
to August 31, 1984 (hereinafter referred to as the "Wherry
lease").

(T. 16-17 & 79-80).

Sometime prior to November 1978, Wherry and Wesley F. Sine
became acquainted with each other at meetings with the Bowling
Proprietors Association, where they discussed the Sines' acquir2

ing the bowling establishment and business.

(T. 18-20 & 133-36).

Sine was an attorney and has been a member of the Utah State Bar
since 1962.

(T. 131, 156). Following negotiations, the parties

entered into a Stock Purchase Agreement on February 1, 1979 in
which the Sines agreed to purchase 200 shares of common stock of
Wasatch Bowling, Inc.

(T. 20-22) (See Stock Purchase Agreement,

attached as Addendum 3 ) .

Pursuant to the Stock Purchase Agree-

ment, the Sines agreed to pay $435,000 to Wherry and the other
appellees as follows: $35,000 on the execution of the Agreement
and consecutive monthly payments due the first day of each month
commencing March 1, 1979 and continuing for fifteen years.
22-24).

(T.

Following the execution of the Agreement, Wherry and the

other appellees were released from their lease with Skankey.

(T.

37).
Paragraph 18 of the Addendum to the Stock Purchase Agreement
states the following:
Sellers agree to use their best efforts
to obtain an extension of the lease mentioned
in paragraph #4 for a period of an additional
15 years, to and including the year 1999, on
the terms and conditions heretofore discussed
between sellers and the landlord as disclosed
by sellers to buyers.
(See Addendum 3 ) .

All the parties understood and agreed that

Wherry was to act for and on behalf of all the sellers or appellees in connection with the Stock Purchase Agreement including
subsequent negotiations with Skankey regarding the extension of
the Wherry lease.

(See Findings of Fact 1f6, attached as Addendum

2).

3

The peirties also understood that by "best efforts," Wherry
was not guciranteeing or making any promises that Skankey would
grant an extension of the Wherry lease to the Sines or enter into
a new lease agreement with the Sines on the same terms and
conditions as previously existed in the Wherry lease.
61-62),

(T. 57 &

Sine testified that he was aware as a lawyer that he

could have, but did not, require language in the Agreement
mandating that if Wherry was unable to secure the lease extension
the Agreement would have been voided.

(T. 161-62).

Following several attempts by Wherry to secure an extension
for the Sines of the Wherry lease, Sine personally negotiated a
new lease in 1984 for the building with Skankeyfs leasing agent.
(T. 93 & 168). Sine agreed to spend another $200,000 on improvements in the property and to a rental increase each year thereafter.

(T. 168-170).

Sine testified at trial that at no time

after he negotiated this new lease with Skankey in 1984 did he
communicate with or notify Wherry that he considered him in
breach of the Stock Purchase Agreement.

(T. 170). And according

to Skankey, Sine never complained or objected to paying an
increase in rent because it was more than Wherry paid under his
lease.

(T. 97-98).

Skankey further testified that the leasing

business is dynamic and from 1979 to 1984, lease rates changed
dramatically.

(T. 114).

The Sines ceased making payments to Wherry in June of 1988
and fell into arrears for several months.

When Wherry brought

this action, the outstanding balance due under the Stock Purchase
4

Agreement was $162,381.43.

(T. 40-42 & 44-46).

Sine admitted at

trial that by June of 1988 he did not intend to make any further
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement.

(T. 171). The

Sines' financial difficulties continued and in August of 1989,
because of rent collection problems, the Sines were evicted from
the Olympus Hills Shopping Center.

(T. 99-100).

Wherry testified at trial that he felt he had exerted his
best efforts to obtain an extension for the Sines the terms of
the Wherry lease.

(T. 65-66 & 73). He met with Skankey several

times and discussed an extension of the Wherry lease and terms
for the Sines.

(T. 25). Both Wherry and Skankey testified that

they discussed an extension of the Wherry lease for the Sinesf
beneift initially in August of 1979.

(T. 26, 60-62 & 89).

According to both witnesses, Wherry expressly requested that
Skankey extend to the Sines the same lease terms that Wherry had.
(T. 27, 62 & 90). Both witnesses also testified that Wherry and
Skankey had other discussions regarding a lease extension to the
Sines after this initial meeting.

(T. 29-30 & 91). Wherry

testified that although he could not remember precise dates,
there were approximately a half dozen other discussions after
this first meeting he had with Skankey concerning an extension of
the Wherry lease terms.

(T. 29-36, 61, 63-64).

He further

testified that he had several telephone conversations with
Skankey during the five year period between their first meeting
in 1979 and 1984 concerning the extension.

(T. 36-37).

Skankey

also testified that he and Wheery had both face to face and
5

telephone discussions after their 1979 meeting regarding extending the Wherry lease terms to the Sines.

(T. 92).

Wherry and Skankey both testified that they met again in February
of 1984 to discuss an extension of the Wherry lease terms for the
Sines.

(T. 65, 91-93 & 104). According to these two witnesses,

Wherry again expressly requested Skankey to extend the same terms
to the Sines that he had been extended to Wherry.
105).

(T. 65, 92 &

Skankey responded that he was negotiating with Wesley Sine

but that he was not willing to extend the same terms to the
Sines.

(T. 93 & 105). Skankey also testified that at no time

from 1979 until this law suit did the Sines ask him whether
Wherry had requested him to extend the Wherry lease terms for the
Sines' benefit.

(T. 94).

Following trial, the court entered detailed findings of fact
to support its conclusion that Wherry on behalf of all the
appellees fully performed his duties and responsibilities under
the Stock Purchase Agreement and used his best efforts to obtain
an extension of the Wherry lease terms for the Sines.

The court

also made findings and concluded that the Sines waived any claim
regarding the failure of Wherry's performance under the Stock
Purchase Agreement.

The court determined therefore that the

Sines were not justified in withholding payments under the Stock
Purchase Agreement and their intentional refusal to make future
payments constituted a breach of the Agreement.

(See Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law, attached as Addendum 2 ) .

6

SUMMARY OF APPELLEES' ARGUMENT
The Sines' brief on appeal seeking reversal of the trial
court's judgment is premised on underlying facts taken out of
context, disregards the broad discretion given to trial courts,
fails to marshal the evidence and misinterprets clear legal
principles.
The Sines' first argument, that the trial court erred in
weighing Wherry's testimony, ignores the broad discretion afforded the trial court in determining the weight and credibility
given to a witness.

The Sines simply point to one or two isolat-4

ed inconsistencies in Wherry's testimony that are insignificant
and wholly irrelevant when put into context with the rest of his
and Skankey's testimonies.

Indeed, the record of the trial

proceedings shows that Wherry's testimony was internally consistent, credible and harmonious with the testimony of Skankey.
This Court need not reach the merits of the Sines' second
argument that Wherry failed to use his "best efforts" as required
under the Stock Purchase Agreement for two reasons.

First, the

Sines fail to marshal the evidence in support of the trial
court's verdict and then demonstrate that even viewing it in the
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the findings.

In accordance with this Court's

recent directive regarding the consequence of an appellant
failing to marshal the evidence, the merits of the Sines' failure-to-use "best-efforts" contention need not be addressed on
appeal.

Second, the Sines fail to acknowledge or even address

7

the trial court's finding that they knowingly waived any claim
regarding the failure of Wherry's performance under the Stock
Purchase Agreement.
Even if this Court decides to reach the merits of the Sines'
failure-to--use "best-efforts" claim, the trial court did not err
in determining that Wherry used his best efforts.

The Sines

misconstrue the case law by suggesting that "best efforts"
required Wherry to exert himself to extend the lease until all
efforts had been exhausted.

The law is clear that "best efforts"

is equivalent to "good faith" and requires only a standard of
conduct that depends on the circumstances of the parties.

The

trial court's uncontested findings of fact show that the trial
court in fact carefully evaluated and considered the circumstances in this case before reaching its decision that Wherry used his
"best efforts."

Based on the trial court's findings, there is no

doubt that Wherry used his "best efforts" in accordance with his
obligation under the Stock Purchase Agreement.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED DISCRETION
IN FINDING T.E. WHERRY'S TESTIMONY CREDIBLE

In their first point on appeal, the Sines contend that the
trial court gave Wherry's testimony too much credence.

The court

found that "the testimony on behalf of the Plaintiffs by the
Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was believable, credible, forthright and
honest."

(See Finding of Fact 1f9, attached as Addendum 2 ) .

The

Sines assert that Skankey's testimony should have been afforded

8

much greater weight than Wherry's since Skankey was a so-called
adverse witness and that Wherry's testimony is suspect given
certain inconsistencies and his inability to recall exact dates.
A.

It is the Trial Court's Discretion to Determine the Weight or Credibility of a Witness

The law is clear that it is not the function of appellate
courts to determine the credibility of the witnesses.
Bagley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1984).

State v.

Broad discretion is

afforded trial courts in determining the weight and credibility
given to a witness.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides

that "due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses."
Proc. 52(a) (1991).

Utah Rule Civ.

And the Utah Supreme Court has stated that

"[d]eciding whether a witness is believable and determining what
weight to assign a witness's testimony are matters within the
discretion of the finder of fact."

Lemon v. Coates, 735 P.2d 58,

60 (Utah 1987).
B.

The Sines Fail to Show that the Trial Court
Abused its Discretion in Finding Wherry's
Testimony Credible

The Sines' "inescapable conclusion" that Skankey's testimony
should be afforded greater weight than Wherry's testimony presumes, without any support from the record, that the court in
fact ascribed lesser credence to Skankey's testimony.

There is

no evidence anywhere in the record that the court afforded
Skankeyfs testimony less weight.

Moreover, the weight of Skan-

key f s testimony is wholly irrelevant to assessing the weight and
9

credibility of Wherry's testimony.

Even if determining the

weight of Skankey's testimony somehow had merit, comparing such
weight with that given to Wherry's testimony is academic since
their testimonies are concordant and supportive of each other.
There is little substance, if any, to the two isolated
inconsistencies that the Sines attribute to Wherry's testimony.
First, contrary to the Sines' contentions, Wherry's testimony
that he would use his best efforts to extend the same lease terms
an additional fifteen years is consonant with his statement that
he could not guarantee the lease extension.
not guarantee a promised result.

Best efforts does

The parties unquestionably

understood the symmetry of Wherry's testimony that his best
efforts merely comprised a promise on his part that the would
make a good faith attempt to help secure a favorable lease
extension to the Sines.

(T. 57, 61-62).

As Sine testified, he

knew as an attorney that he could have, but did not, insert
language in the Stock Purchase Agreement that would require
Wherry to secure the lease extension.

(T. 161-62).

Wherry's

testimony would only have been inconsistent with his "bestefforts" promise had he testified of guaranteeing the Sines an
extension of the Wherry lease terms.
Second, Wherry's testimony regarding the meetings and
discussions he had with Skankey also fully comports with Skankeyfs version of events.

Both witnesses testified that they met

in at least 1979 and 1984 to discuss extending the Sines' lease
with the same terms as had existed between Wherry and Skankey.
10

(T. 26, 60-62, 65, 89, 91-93 & 104). Both witnesses also testified that they had discussions concerning the lease extension
over the telephone as well as face to face.

(T. 36-37 & 92).

The fact that the witnesses were unable to mutually pinpoint the
precise numbers of times they met is of no significance in light
of their accord regarding their primary meetings, discussions and
the substance of their conversations.
The Sines' final point that Wherry's testimony is suspect
because of his inability to recall exact dates of telephone calls
and casual conversations with Skankey is, again, devoid of any
merit.

It is difficult for any witness to recall with precision

the date on which they had a telephone call or casual conversation with another.

Given Wherry's age and the time frame of his

conversations with Skankey, Wherry's recollection was impressive.
The overall consistency, detail and substance of Wherry's testimony renders any memory lapse of exact dates and times of no
consequence.
In sum, the record conclusively shows that Wherry's testimony is internally consistent, and fully comports with Skankey's
testimony.

The Sines resort to isolated examples of alleged

incongruities and contradictions that, when put into context, are
of little importance to the overall credibility of Wherry's
testimony.

It is the trial court's prerogative to weigh a

witnesses' testimony.

Beyond alleging only a few so-called

inconsistencies, the Sines fail to show that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding Wherry's testimony credible.
11

II.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT
WHERRY EMPLOYED HIS BEST EFFORTS
AS REQUIRED BY THE STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
In their second point, the Sines argue that the evidence
does not support the trial courtf s conclusion that Wherry used
his best efforts on behalf of the Sines to extend the Wherry
lease terms that existed in the 1979 lease agreement between
Wherry and Skankey.

The Sines propose that "best efforts"

required Wherry to have repeated meetings and discussions through
the five-year period "until all efforts had been exhausted to
complete the obligation of the Plaintiff [Wherry] to extend the
lease on favorable terms."
A.

Standard of Review is "Clearly Erroneous"

On appeal of a judgment from a bench trial, the appellate
courts in Utah defer to the trial court's factual assessment and
review its findings under the "clearly erroneous" standard.
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 192 (Utah 1987); Copper State
Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furn. Co., 770 P.2d 88, 93
(Utah Ct. App. 1988); Utah Civ. Pro. 52(a) (1991).

Findings of

fact are only clearly erroneous if it can be shown that they "are
against the clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate
court otherwise reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made."
B.

Walker, 743 P.2d at 193.

The Sines Fail to Marshal the Evidence

The Utah Court of Appeals has recently held that "in subsequent cases, defendants [appellants] will be required to marshal
12

the evidence in support of the verdict in order to have their
sufficiency of the evidence claims dealt with on the merits."
State v. Moore, 802 P.2d 732, 739 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

This

requirement follows the rule set forth from the Utah Supreme
Court that in civil appeals from bench trials, Utah appellate
courts require appellants to "marshal all evidence in support of
the trial courtf s findings and then demonstrate that even viewing
it in the light most favorable to the court below, the evidence
is insufficient to support the findings."
700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985).

Scharf v. BMG Corp.,

This requirement of marshaling

the evidence is consistent with the broad deference owed to the
fact finder at trial.

Moore, 802 P.2d at 739.

The consequence

of the appellant's failure to marshal the evidence is well
settled:

"[i]f the appellant fails to so marshal the evidence,

the appellate court need not consider the challenge to its
sufficiency."

Id. at 738-39.

Because the Sines failed to marshal the evidence, their
challenges to the trial court's factual findings can readily be
disposed of.

The Sines make arguments based solely on the facts

as they presented them to the trial court, such as the importance
Sine attached to the lease extension and a few isolated portions
of Skankey's testimony that they mischaracterize.

At no point do

the Sines even discuss the detailed findings entered by the trial
court to support its judgment that under the circumstances Wherry
used his best efforts. The Sines have not even begun to carry the
"heavy burden" of marshaling the evidence supporting the trial
13

court's detailed findings.

Scharf, 700 P.2d at 1070,

In accor-

dance with the court of appeal's explicit directive in Moore, the
merits of the Sines' contention need not be addressed or considered on appeal.
C.

The Sines Fail to Address the Court's Finding
that they Knowingly Waived any Claim Regarding the Failure of Wherry's Performance Under
the Stock Purchase Agreement

The trial court determined that "Defendants [the Sines]
knowingly waived any claim regarding the failure of Plaintiffs
performance under the Stock Purchase Agreement."1
sion of Lawr ir3, attached as Addendum 2).

(See Conclu-

This Court in Barnes v.

Wood, 750 P.2d 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), stated that "[w]hether
a right has been waived is generally a question of fact and
therefore we accord considerable deference to the finder of
fact's determination."

_Id. at 1230.2

To support its determina-

tion, the trial court made findings of fact that (1) the Sines
made payments due under the Stock Purchase Agreement to Wherry

x

The Sines' alleged claim would have accrued in 1984 when the
lease agreement between Skankey and Wherry terminated and Sine
negotiated a new lease agreement with Skankey.
2

With respect to waiver, the Utah Supreme Court has held:
A waiver is the intentional relinquishment of
a known right. To constitute a waiver, there
must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, a knowledge of its existence, and an
intention to relinquish it. It must be distinctly made, although it may be express or
implied.

Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (1983); see also B.R. Woodward
Mktg. v. Collins Food, 754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
14

from the date of execution of the Agreement in 1979 through May
of 1988; and (2) at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did the
Sines give notice to or advise Wherry that they were not satisfied with his efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry
lease on their behalf nor that payments under the Stock Purchase
Agreement would be withheld by reason of Wherry's inability to
secure such extension.

(See Findings of Fact 1Mfl3 & 15, attached

as Addendum 2 ) .
The Sines do not even address the trial court's determination that the Sines knowingly waived their failure-to-use "bestefforts" claim, let alone contend on appeal that the trial
court's findings of facts are insufficient to support its determination.

By affirming the trial court's findings and subsequent

judgment that the Sines waived any claim regarding the failure of
Wherry's use of "best efforts" under the Stock Purchase Agreement, this Court has further reason to not reach the merits of
the Sines' failure to use "best-efforts" contention .
D.

Trial Court Did Not Err in Determining That
Wherry Used His Best Efforts

Contrary to the Sines' representation, there is some authority in Utah regarding what constitutes "best efforts."

These

few cases are in complete unison with federal cases that have
more fully articulated what requirements "best efforts" impose.
Based on these cases, the law is clear that "best efforts" is
equivalent to "good faith" and requires a certain standard of
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conduct or effort that depends on the circumstances of the parties.
In Hanover Ltd, v. Fields, 568 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977), the
Supreme Court viewed a "best efforts" promise as equivalent to a
responsibility to exercise good faith.

The trial court had found

that the underlying condition of all the dealings of the parties
was that mutual best efforts would be used to secure financing
for the purchase of a condominium.

The Supreme Court held that

there was no evidence of the defendant holding back or an unwillingness on her part to obtain financing that would indicate a
lack of a good faith effort.

.Id. at 752-53.

In Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
this Court held that the clause calling for best efforts does not
require the party to be successful in order to fulfill his
contractual obligation.

In that case there was a promise by one

party to use his "best efforts" to substitute himself as an
obligor on a first trust deed and note.

The fact that the party

was not successful in doing so was not a bar to enforcement of
the agreement.
The federal cases also uniformly hold that "best efforts" is
analogous to "good faith."

As noted by the First Circuit Court,

"[w]e have been unable to find any case in which a court found,
as here, thcit a party acted in good faith but did not use its
best efforts."

Triple-A Baseball Club Assoc, v. Northeastern

Baseball, Inc., 832 F.2d 214, 225 (1st Cir. 1987).

The equiva-

lency of "beist efforts" to "good faith, " precludes deciding in a
vacuum whether a party exercised its "best efforts."
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The term

"best efforts" is fluid and as such requires a different level of
performance and effort depending on the circumstances.

As one

federal court recently articulated:
Federal courts also have acknowledged that
the term "best efforts" "cannot be defined in
terms of a fixed formula . . . [but] varies
with the facts and the field of law involved"
and is a "term which necessarily takes its
meaning from the circumstances."
NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C. v. Bridgewater Steam Power, 740 F. Supp.
1140, 1151 (W.D.N.C. 1990) (quoting Triple-A Baseball Club
Assoc., 832 F.2d at 225, cert, denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct.
1111, 99 L.Ed.2d 272 (1988).

The cases the Sines cite also

support this legal doctrine that "best efforts" is wholly dependent on the circumstances.

See Joyce Beverages of N.Y., Inc. v.

Royal Crown Cola, 555 F. Supp. 271, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); 3 Bloor
v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 454 F.Supp. 258, 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1978),
aff'd, 601 F.2d 609 (2nd Cir. 1979).

The circumstances to be

considered include "a party's experience, expertise, financial
status, opportunities, and other abilities."

3

NCNB Nat. Bank of

The Sines cite Joyce for the proposition in their brief thar
"mere 'even efforts 1 " is not sufficient to avoid a breach of
contract claim." (Brief p. 12). When put into context this phrase
"even efforts" makes sense and is in complete accord with Wherry's
position. The issue in Joyce was whether a soft drink bottler's
acceptance of a license and franchise to distribute a competing
cola product constituted a material breach of its obligation under
the "best efforts" clause of its original cola products franchise
agreement.
Joyce argued that it would be able to protect the
interests of its original cola franchise and the new franchise
"evenhandedly." The court determined, however, that Joyce could
not take on a competing cola product and still promote the original
cola franchise "evenhandedly, much less with its best efforts
focused on its best interests under the circumstances."
Joyce
Beverages of N.Y., Inc., 555 F.Supp. at 276 (emphasis added).
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N.C., 740 F.Supp. at 1151; see also Triple-A Baseball Club Assoc.
v. Northeastern Baseball, Inc., 655 F.Supp. 513, 540 (D.Me.),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, and remanded, 832 F.2d 214 (1st
Cir. 1987), cert, denied, 485 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct. 1111, 99
L.Ed.2d 272 (1988); Bloor, 454 F.Supp. at 267.

Further, as

stated by Western Geophysical Co. v. Bolt A s s o c , 584 F.2d 1164
(2d Cir. 1978), which the Sines also cite, where a party encounters difficult problems in carrying out the terms of a contract,
no breach of a "best efforts" clause occurs.

_Id. at 1171-72.4

These cases present a different picture of what "best
efforts" constitutes than what the Sines advance in their brief.
"Best efforts" does not require a party, as the Sines state, to
exert themselves until "all efforts have been exhausted."
Triple-A Baseball Club states:

As

"We have found no cases, and none

have been cited, holding that 'best efforts' means every conceivable effort . . . ."

Id. at 228.

4

Best efforts is tantamount to

The Sines cite Western Geophysical Co. for its statement that
"best efforts" means "active exploitation in good faith. . . . "
Id. at 1171. This phrase was taken from a 1911 federal district
court opinion and was quoted by the second circuit in Western
Geophysical Co. as a reference to what the trial judge used as a
standard of "best efforts."
When put into context with the
circumstances involved in the case, the phrase "active exploitation
in good faith" was a sensible standard in Western Geophysical Co.
for "best efforts" and in no way, contrary to the Sines' argument,
posits a static formula of what constitutes "best efforts."
Western Geophysical Co. involved an exclusive licensing agreement
that required Western "to use it best efforts to promote worldwide
licensing and use" of a Pneumatic Acoustical Repeater. The second
circuit agreed with the trial court that "best efforts" under the
circumstances in the case constituted active exploitation in good
faith. The appellate court also affirmed that the trial court's
finding that Western used its best efforts by acting "in complete
good faith" and by exercising "sound business judgment" throughout
the licensing period. Ld. at 1170-72.
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good faith and therefore what constitutes best efforts in any
given case depends on the circumstances.

NCNB Nat. Bank of N.C.,

740 F.Supp. at 1151.
In this case, the trial court properly accounted for the
circumstances and made applicable findings that are uncontested
by the Sines on appeal.

First, the court considered the nature

of Wherry's promise and the subsequent expectations of the
parties.

Its findings included that (1) the parties understood

that Wherry gave no guarantee that Skankey would extend the same
lease terms to the Sines; (2) Sine was aware he could have
required language mandating the lease extension as a condition
precedent to their performance under the Stock Purchase Agreement; and (3) at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did Sine give
notice to or advise Wherry that the Sines were not satisfied with
his efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry lease nor that
payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement would be withheld by
reason of Wherry's inability to secure such an extension.

(See

Findings of Fact 1Mf7, 8 & 15, attached as Addendum 2 ) .
The trial court also evaluated the parties' experience,
expertise, opportunities and other abilities.

Its findings

included that 1) Sine was a member of the Utah State Bar; 2)
there was nothing Wherry could have done from 1979 to 1984 which
would have resulted in different or more favorable terms than
those contained in the lease subsequently negotiated and executed
between Skankey and Sine; 3) at all times after 1979, Sine was in
a better position to negotiate an extension of the lease than was
19

Wherry; and 4) the only influence Wherry had to bring to bear on
the negotiations was whatever good faith existed between himself
and Skankey. (See Findings of Fact tf8, 10 & 11, attached as
Addendum 2 ) .
Finally, the trial court assessed the difficult problems
Wherry encountered in carrying out his promise to use his "best
efforts."

Its findings included that 1) expenses attributable to

the maintenance of the shopping center and other economic factors
changed significantly between the date of the execution of the
Stock Purchase Agreement and August 31, 1984; and 2) because of
these economic factors, Wherry's efforts could not have done
anything to influence Skankey in extending the Wherry lease terms
to the Sines.

(See Finding of Fact if 11, attached as Addendum 2 ) .

Under these carefully measured circumstances,

the court

found that Wherry's meeting with Skankey three times in 1979 and
at least one time in 1984 in an effort to obtain an extension of
the Wherry lease on behalf of the Sines constituted "best efforts" under the Stock Purchase Agreement.

(See Finding of Fact

1f9 & Conclusion of Law 1f2, attached as Addendum 2 ) . The trial
court's decision certainly comports with the principles of good
faith as laid out by the courts in Utah and other jurisdictions
that have addressed what requirements "best efforts" impose.
CONCLUSION
The district court's comprehensive and meticulous findings
of facts withstand the Sines' contention that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding Wherry's testimony credible and
20

that Wherry used his "best efforts" as required by the Stock
Purchase Agreement.

For the reasons set forth above, this Court

should affirm the trial court's judgment in all respects and
award appellees their costs.
DATED t h i s

3/^ay

of

May,

1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSION

CLARK W.
MICHAEL T. ROBERT
Attorneys for Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I am a member of and/or employed by
the law firm of Campbell Maack & Sessions, 170 South Main, Suite
400, Salt Lake City, Utah, and that in said capacity and pursuant
to Rule 21(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, four (4)
true and correct copies of the Brief of Appellees were served
upon:
Dean H. Becker
349 South 200 East, #170
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
by hand delivery, this ^ > ; day of May, 1991.
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESS

CtfSRK W. SESSIONS
MICHAEL T. ROBERTS
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CLARK L. SNELSON (4673)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Civil Action, File Number 880907336CN
T. E. WHERRY, T. E. WHERRY,
JR., JAMES I. WHERRY,
custodian, ANITA I. WHERRY,
custodian, GAYLE W. JENSEN,
JEFFREY E. JENSEN, custodian,
SEAN D. JENSEN, custodian,
JESSICA A. JENSEN, custodian,
Plaintiffs,
VS .

!
!
s
>
i
:
:

JUDGMENT

\
!

:
WESLEY F. SINE, MELVA CAROL
i
SINE, JERRY SINE and DORA SINE,!
s
Defendants.
:

Judge Michael R. Murphy

The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial before
the Court, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, District Judge,
presiding, and the issues having been duly tried and the Court
having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law and good cause appearing, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

1.

That the Plaintiffs have and recover of and from the

Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the sum of
$162,964,63, and
2.

That the Plaintiffs have and recover from the Defendants

Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the sum of $8,255.75, representing Plaintiffs' attorneys fees and costs, and
3.

That the amount of this Judgment shall bear interest at

the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum as by law provided,
and,
4.

That the Counterclaim of the Defendants Wesley F. Sine

and Melva Carol Sine, be and the same is hereby dismissed with
prejudice, and on the merits, and that the Defendants Wesley F.
Sine and Melva Carol Sine shall take nothing thereby.
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this CNJ1^ day of Mageh, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

_JL
MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the \L[ & day of March, 1990, the
foregoing JUDGMENT was served on Defendants Wesley F. Sine and
Carol Melva Sine by hand delivering a true and correct copy
thereof by first class mail, postage prepaid, to:
Dean H. Becker, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CLARK W. SESSIONS (2914)
CLARK L. SNELSON (467 3)
CAMPBELL MAACK & SESSIONS
First Interstate Plaza, Suite 400
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1605
Telephone: (801) 537-5555
Attorneys for Plaintiffs
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
T. E. WHERRY, T. E. WHERRY,
JR., JAMES I. WHERRY,
custodian, ANITA I. WHERRY,
custodian, GAYLE W. JENSEN,

:
:
i
i

JEFFREY E. JENSEN, custodian,

i

SEAN D. JENSEN, custodian,
!
JESSICA A. JENSEN, custodian, :
t
Plaintiffs,
s
s
vs.
s
I
WESLEY F. SINE, MELVA CAROL
:
SINE, JERRY SINE and DORA SINE,:
Defendants.
The

above-entitled

matter

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. 880907336CN

Judge Michael R. Murphy

:
came

on

regularly

for trial

pursuant to notice before the undersigned, one of the Judges of
the above-entitled Court on Friday, March 2, 1990, and concluding
Wednesday, March 7, 1990. The Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was present
in person and the Plaintiffs were represented by Clark W.
Sessions and Clark L. Snelson of Campbell Maack & Sessions, their
attorneys.

The Defendant Wesley F. Sine was present in person

and said Defendant and Melva Carol Sine were represented by Dean

H. Becker, their attorney.
Sine had previously

The Defendants Jerry Sine and Dora

filed a petition in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for Utah and the above-entitled matter as to
said Defendants was stayed.

The Court heard and considered the

testimony of the witnesses, the documents and writings offered
and received, the arguments and statements of counsel, including
the written memoranda filed in connection therewith, and having
taken the matter under advisement now makes and enters the
following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That on March 31, 1961, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry and

Lucile M. Wherry, his wife, executed a lease agreement as lessees
with Skaggs Properties, Inc. as lessor

(herein the "Wherry

Lease") and that pursuant to the Wherry Lease, Plaintiff T.E.
Wherry assumed possession of a certain building known as the
Wasatch Bowling Lanes in the Olympus Hills Shopping Center, Salt
Lake City, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

That the Wherry Lease remained in full force and effect

during the term thereof until May 4, 1971, when it was extended
by mutual written agreement of the parties to August 31, 1984.
3.

That prior to November, 1978, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry

and the Defendant Wesley F. Sine became acquainted with each
other
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through

a

trade

association
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and

discussions

ensued

concerning

the possibility of the Defendants

acquiring the

Plaintiff's bowling establishment and business.
4.

That such negotiations continued between the parties and

resulted in the execution of a Stock Purchase Agreement on or
about February 5, 1979.
5.

That the Stock Purchase Agreement required, among other

things, that the Plaintiffs use their best efforts to obtain an
extension of the Wherry Lease on the same terms and conditions
for the benefit of the Defendants at the expiration of the term
of the Wherry Lease as extended, August 31, 1984.
6.

That

all

parties

understood

and

agreed

that

the

Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was acting for and on behalf of all
Plaintiffs in connection with the Stock Purchase Agreement and
subsequent negotiations with management of the shopping center
with respect to the extension of the Wherry Lease.
7.

That all parties understood that the Plaintiffs were in

no way guaranteeing that the shopping center management as lessor
would grant an extension of the Wherry Lease to the Defendants
or enter into a new lease agreement with the Defendants on the
same terms and conditions as previously existed between the
Plaintiffs and the lessor.
8.

That the negotiations of the parties with respect to the

Stock Purchase Agreement were conducted in part by Plaintiffs'
counsel, Richard H. Moffat, Esq. and Wesley Sine on behalf of the

210156A.PL3
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Defendants, Mr, Sine being a member of the Utah State Bar.
Further, that had the securing of a lease extension been critical
to the Stock Purchase Agreement, Defendant Wesley F. Sine was
aware that he could have required language mandating that result
and in addition, could have made the obtaining of the lease
extension a condition precedent to Defendants' performance under
the Stock Purchase Agreement.
9.

That the testimony on behalf of the Plaintiffs by the

Plaintiff T.E. Wherry was believable, credible, forthright and
honest.

Further, the Plaintiff T.E. Wherry met with Mr. Richard

Skancky, a principal of the management of the Olympus Hills
Shopping Center owner three times in 1979 and at least one time
in 1984 in an effort to obtain an extension of the Wherry Lease
or securing a new lease containing similar favorable terms on
behalf of the Defendants.
10.
done

That there was nothing that the Plaintiffs could have

from

1979 through

1984 which would

have resulted in

different or more favorable terms than those contained in the
lease subsequently negotiated and executed between the Defendants
and the owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center; furthermore,
that

significant

and

substantial

remodeling

efforts

were

undertaken by the Defendants as a part of such new lease and
costs

and expenses

attributable

to the maintenance of the

shopping center and other economic factors changed significantly
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between the date of the execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement
and August 31, 1984,
11.

That at all times after 1979, the Defendant Wesley F.

Sine was in a better position to negotiate an extension of the
Wherry Lease than were the Plaintiffs and the only influence the
Plaintiffs had to bring to bear on the negotiations was whatever
good faith existed between the Plaintiff T. E. Wherry and the
owner of the Olympus Hills Shopping Center.
12.

That

the Plaintiff

T. E. Wherry,

his wife

(since

deceased) and family corporation were released from the Wherry
Lease following the execution of the Stock Purchase Agreement.
13.

That the Defendants made payments due under the Stock

Purchase Agreement to the Plaintiffs from the date of execution
of the Stock Purchase Agreement, through May, 1988, when a
partial payment for the month of June, 1988 was made.
14.

That the Defendants did not intend to make any further

payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement.
15.

That at no time prior to October 11, 1988, did the

Defendant Wesley F. Sine give notice to or advise the Plaintiffs
that the Defendants were not satisfied with the Plaintiffs'
efforts in securing an extension of the Wherry Lease on behalf
of the Defendants nor that payments under the Stock Purchase
Agreement

would

be withheld

by

inability to secure such extension.
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reason

of

the Plaintiffs'

16.

That there remains due and owing under the Stock

Purchase Agreement to the Plaintiffs from the Defendants Wesley
F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, the total sum of $162,964.63, which
includes interest through the date of execution hereof.
17.

That the bowling business of the Defendants conducted

at the Wasatch Lanes seriously declined, which decline was not
attributable to the actions of the Plaintiffs and which decline
resulted

in the

Defendants

default

under

their

lease and

subsequent eviction from the Olympus Hills Shopping Center.
18.

That Plaintiffs were required to retain the services of

attorneys

to prosecute

the

above-entitled

action

and that

Plaintiffs' attorneys fees are reasonable and were necessarily
incurred in the prosecution of the above-entitled action and are
awardable pursuant to the express terms of the Stock Purchase
Agreement.
19.

That the Counterclaim of the Defendants is without

factual or legal support.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
concludes as follows:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The above-entitled action is stayed as to the Defendants

Jerry Sine and Dora Sine pursuant to the Federal Bankruptcy Code,
11 USC S 362(a).
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2.

Plaintiffs

fully

performed

their

duties

and

responsibilities under the Stock Purchase Agreement and used
their best efforts to obtain an extension of the Wherry Lease on
behalf of Defendants.
3.

Defendants knowingly waived any claim regarding the

failure of Plaintiffs performance under the Stock Purchase
Agreement.
4.

Defendants are not and were not justified in withholding

payments under the Stock Purchase Agreement and their intentional
refusal to make future payments constitutes a breach of the Stock
Purchase Agreement.
5.

That

Plaintiffs

have

been

damaged

and

injured by

Defendants' breach of the Stock Purchase Agreement in the amount
of $162f381.43 plus interest thereon in the amount of $36.45 per
diem until the entry of judgment herein.
6.
their

That Plaintiffs are entitled to be awarded judgment in
favor

and

against

the

Defendants

in

the

amount of

$162,381.43 together with interest as aforesaid and attorneys
fees and costs in the amount of $8,255.95.
7.

That the Counterclaim

of the Defendants

should be

dismissed with prejudice and on the merits.
8.

That the Court should make and enter its judgment

accordingly.

210156A.PL3
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DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
j

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the f 7 '' day of March, 1990, the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were served on
Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine by hand delivering
a true and correct copy thereof by first class mail, postage
prepaid, to:
Dean H. Becker, Esq,
Attorney for Defendants
6540 South State Street
Murray, Utah 84107

•C-kk-.
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DATED this

day of March, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

MICHAEL R. MURPHY
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

qrL>

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the II

day of March, 1990, the

foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW were served on
Defendants Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine by hand delivering
a true and correct copy thereof by first class mail, postage
prepaid, to:
Dean H. Becker, Esq.
Attorney for Defendants
433 South 400 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

pf\ .C.UIL- O.-Usfa
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STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT is made and entered into on
the

/ > /

r*cfr\ru&fL^

day of

w

/ 19 79, by and between^ ~p\

h

T. E. Wherry, T. E. Wherry, Jr., James I. Wherry, Anita I.

V>;

Wherry, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey E. Jensen, Sean D. Jensen and
Jessica A. Jensen, hereinafter collectively referred to as
"Sellers," and Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife, and Wesley F.
Sine and Melva Carol Sine, his wife, hereinafter collectively
referred to as "Buyers,"
WHEREAS, Wasatch Bowling, Inc., hereinafter referred to as
the "Corporation," is a corporation organized under the laws of
the State of Utah, having its principal place of business at
4015 Wasatch Boulevard, Salt Lake City, Salt Lake County, State
of Utah; and
WHEREAS, the only voting stock of the Corporation is the
common stock of which 200 shares are issued and outstanding; and
WHEREAS, the Sellers own the following amounts of such
stock:
T. E. Wherry, Jr.
James I. Wherry
Anita I. Wherry
Gayle W. Jensen
Jeffrey E. Jensen
Sean D. Jensen
T. E. Wherry

50 Shares
15 Shares
15 Shares
50.Shares
10 Shares
10 Shares
40 Shares

Jessica A. Jensen

10 Shares

and
WHEREAS, the Buyers desire to purchase all of said stock and
the Sellers are willing to sell,
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the mutual covenants and conditions herein contained, and other good and
valuable consideration, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as follows:
LAW OFFICES OP
MOFFAT. WELLING & PAULSEN
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION
• T H FLOOR T R I D U N E B U I L D I N G
1 4 3 S O U T H MAIN S T R E E T
S A L T L A K E r i T V IIT4W
fl/?Hl

1.

Sellers hereby sell and transfer to Buyers 200 shares,

comprising all of the outstanding shares of the Corporation, for
a total payment in the sum of $435,000.00, payable as follows:
the sum of $3 5,000.00 down, upon execution of this Agreement, the
receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, with the balance of
$400,000.00 to be payable in monthly payments on the first day of
each and every month, commencing March 1, 19 79, for a period of
fifteen years, in monthly payments of*$3,598.92 for the first
two years, which represents interest on the unpaid balance at the
rate of 9% per annum, and after the payment of twenty-four payments, at the monthly rate of $4,728.56, which represents interest on the unpaid balance at 9 1/2% per annum, until the total-e~
4 ?•• '

180 monthly paymentc—shall have boon made,—and the- contract
balance of $400,000.00, plus interest, is paid in full.
2.

v

-—__

Sellers reserve the right to accept only such amount in

prepayment on the contract as they, in their sole discretion, may
agree upon, but in no event shall more than 29% of the total
purchase price be received by Sellers during the first year of
the term of this Agreement.
3.

Buyers agree to assume the balance due on a Contract .

of Purchase for the bowling equipment, said agreement being dated
the

3^ '

day of {^c^UsvY'

'

19

H2zi'

b

Y

and

between

W^^f

A

Wasatch Bowling, Inc., or T. E. Wherry, and AMF Corporation, 'fei/Q;p
which has a balance of $ H @, P(X c °^

t plus accrued interestrJC^v ',

/

0t^>

and Buyers agree to substitute themselves or others satisfactory
to AMF as guarantors thereon, and to relieve Mr. T. E. Wherry
from any guarantees on account of said obligation.
4.

The Purchasers agree to substitute themselves or other

persons satisfactory to the landlord and to Sellers as guarantors
of any and all obligations, including the lease on the premises,
LAW OFFICES OF
MOFFAT. WELLING & PAULSEN
A PftOFESStONAk CORPORATION
BTH FLOOR T R I B U N E B U I L D I N G
1 4 3 S O U T H MAIN STREET

-3which obligations are currently guaranteed by Mr. T. E. Wherry,
and to relieve him entirely thereof.
5.

Included within the purchase price shall be all

inventory on the premises, maintained at its normal level, as
now established.

Excluded therefrom are all of the tools and

other personal belongings owned by Mr. T. E. Wherry which were
not purchased by the Corporation and which Mr. Wherry will remove from the premises within twenty-four hours of the execution
of this Agreement.
6.

It is acknowledged by the parties that the Buyers have

reviewed the books and records of the Corporation prior to the
execution of this Agreement, and are satisfied with the facts
and figures revealed therein.
7.

The possession of the business by the Buyers shall take

place at beginning of business on the

j^dujis+ys'
8.

/

day of l^~7 c^ w""

, 19 79.

/^&%j

As of the date of possession by the Buyers, all bank :-/->

accounts of the business shall be reduced to zero, and the sums
therein shall remain the property of T. E. Wherry, and all trade
accounts shall be paid current to that date, and all accounts
receivable as of that date shall belong to Mr. T. E. Wherry.
The Buyers agree to cooperate with Mr. Wherry in collecting said
accounts and in the event any are paid to them, which belong to
Mr. Wherry, they agree to promptly remit the same to him.
9*

The parties aaree that for a period of one vear from

the date hereof, the stock of Wasatch Bowlina. Inc. shall be
placed in a satisfactory escrow, at the expense of the Buyers.
with instructions that the Buyers may vote the shares for all
purposes so loner as the Stock Purchase Aqreement between the
Sellers and the Buyers is current.

In the event the Stock

Purchase Aqreement is not current. Mr. T. E. Wherry shall have
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-4the riqht to vote the stock so held in escrow for all purposes
until the contract is made current.

In the event of default,

after fifteen day's notice and said default not havinq been
cured, upon demand bv the Sellers, the escrow aqent shall
redeliver the stock to Sellers and the Stock Purchase Agreement
shall be terminated, and the Sellers shall be entitled to
possession of the business.
10.

The Buyers hereunder do hereby personally guarantee

to pay the unpaid purchase price, as provided herein, and do
further agree to provide a second mortgage or second trust deed
upon the property located in Salt Lake City, State of Utah, known
as "Scotty's Travel Motel," upon which the Buyers represent,
knowing that the Sellers rely thereon, that there is a first
trust deed or mortgage obligation of no more than $249,191.06.
It is further agreed that the second mortgage or trust deed
given to secure the terms of this Agreement shall be and remain
a valid second obligation against the property until the first
obligation is paid, according to its terms, without any renewal
or extension thereof, at which time the obligations running in
favor of the Sellers will become a first obligation against said
property and will remain so until the balance under this Agreement is paid in full.
11.

All payments provided for herein shall be made to

Mr. T. E. Wherry at 875 Donner Way, Salt Lake City, Utah, who
shall act as agent for all of the Sellers.

Any change of agent

for the Sellers must be furnished to the Buyers by notice in
writing, mailed to the business address at 4015 Wasatch Boulevard,
Salt Lake City, Utah.
12.

In the event it becomes necessary to enforce any of the

terms of this Agreement, the party found to be in default agrees
to pay all costs of enforcement, including a reasonable attorney's
r;
I
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ADDENDUM TO STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT
THIS ADDENDUM to "Stock Purchase Agreement" dated
February 5, 1979, by and between T. E. Wherry, T. E. Wherry, Jr.,
James I. Wherry, Anita I. Wherry, Gayle W. Jensen, Jeffrey E.
Jensen, Sean D. Jensen and Jessica A. Jensen, hereinafter referred to as "Sellers," and Jerry Sine and Dora Sine, his wife,
and Wesley F. Sine and Melva Carol Sine, his wife, hereinafter
referred to as "Buyers," WITNESSETH:
WHEREAS, the above-named parties are about to enter
into said "Stock Purchase Agreement," but desire to modify the
terms of said instrument without rewriting that agreement.
NOW THEREFORE, the parties hereto hereby make this
a part of said "Stock Purchase Agreement" in the same manner
and to the same force and effect as if the terms and conditions
of this instrument were written into and were a part thereof,
provided however that to the extent (if at all) that the terms
of this instrument are inconsistent with the terms of said "Stock
Purchase Agreement," the terms of this instrument shall govern
and determine the agreement between the parties.

Accordingly,
r\

the parties further agree as follows:
13.

Attached hereto as exhibit "A" is a balance sheet^ fc/

of the "Corporation" as of the T<^~ day of

^ L ^ ^ V ^ / A ^

/ 197,-<" . *V".

"7< u
Sellers hereby warrant and represent that said balance sheet shoVsV''
the financial

position of said corporation as of said date in

accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;

that

there have been no material changes in the financial position of
the corporation since that date and that there will be no material
changes therein to and including the date upon which buyers obtain
possession of said corporation and its assets;

that there are no

debts or obligations owed by said corporation, including contingent
obligations, which are not shown on said balance sheet;

and that

said corporation is the owner of the assets shown thereon, free
and clear of liens or encumberances, except as disclosed herein.

The parties acknowledge that the assets and liabilities of said
corporation will be modified by the acts contemplated by paragraph
#8 of said "Stock Purchase A g r e e m e n t / but that no other change
therein will occur except in the usual course of business of
said corporation to that date.

Sellers contract and agree that

said corporation will be free and clear of debt, obligations or
claims of any person or organization, including taxes, etc., as
of the date of closing, and agree to indemnify and hold buyers
harmless from any and all claims of any nature whatosever which
may hereafter be asserted against said corporation for acts and
events which occur to and including the date of closing, other
than the debts and obligations expressly assumed by buyers as
specified in said "Stock Purchase Agreement."

In the event that

claims are asserted for income taxes or other such claims which
pertain in part to the period before possession by buyers and in
part to the period after possession by buyers, the parties agree
to pro-rate said claims or expenses according to the period involved
before and after date of possession.

Buyers shall have the right

to terminate, if they so desire, the sub-chapter "S" election
concerning income taxes and/or the right to dissolve the corporation.

In the event that this is done buyers agree to provide the

sellers with the same security interest in any new entity or in
the assets received from that liquidation as is provided in
paragraph #9 of the "Stock Purchase Agreement."
14.

Sellers contract, warrant and represent:

(a)

That the corporation is in good standing with

the State of Utah, and that it possesses all of the power, licenses
and authority necessary to operate the businesses being conducted
on its premises.
(b)

That the sellers are the owners of all of the

issued and outstanding capital stock of the Corporation;

that

they have full right, power and authority to sell and to convey
said stock to buyers, free and clear of the claims or rights of

any other person or organization;

and that they have full power

and authority to enter into this contract and to do the acts
specified herein.
(c)

That there are no lawsuits, governmental investiga-

tions, tax audits or other proceedings pending or threatened
against the corporation according to the best of sellers knowledge.
15.

The parties expect to make a physical inventory of

the personal property of the corporation which, when completed,
will be attached to and become a part of this agreement, as exhibit
"D".

Sellers agree that all corporate personal property customarily

and ordinarily used in the operation of the businesses of the
corporation on the corporate premises which are necessary to the
operation of said businesses are now present on said premises and
are owned by the corporation;

that said personal property will

remain on the premises and will be delivered to buyer when possession
of said premises is given to buyers hereunder, and are included in
this transactions.

Sellers warrant that they are the owners of

all of said property, free and clear of liens or encumberances,
except as noted and specified in said "Stock Purchase Agreement."
16.

Buyers agree that they will pay and discharge the

following liens against the "Scotty's Travel Motel" mentioned in
paragraph #10 of said "Stock Purchase Agreement:"
(a)

1977 property taxes $582.50 - #77-03-1974

(b)

1977 property taxes $1,599.32 - #77-03-1975

(c)

1977 property taxes $1,041.69 - #77-03-1976

(d)

1977 property taxes $2,130.57 - #77-03-1981

17.

Under the terms of paragraph #3 and 4 of said

"Stock Purchase Agreement" buyers have an obligation to assume
and pay certain debts and obligations of the corporation and to
cause sellers to be released from liability thereunder.

Said

paragraphs are hereby modified to provide that buyers will use
their best efforts to cause sellers to be released from liability
thereunder, but that if such cannot be accomplished at this time

that they will continue to use reasonable efforts to cause said
release to be effected as soon as it can reasonably be accomplished;
that buyers agree to indemnify and hold sellers harmless from
liability which may be sustained or loss which may be incurred
by sellers in the event that any of said assumed obligations
are not paid and discharged by the corporation or by buyers.
18.

Sellers agree to use their best efforts to obtain

an extension of the lease mentioned in paragraph #4 for a period
of an additional 15 years, to and including the year 1999, on
the terms and conditions heretofore discussed between sellers
and the landlord as disclosed by sellers to buyers.

A copy of

the lease date March 31, 1961, is attached hereto as exhibit "B",
and a copy of the modification to said lease dated May 4, 1971,
is annexed hereto as exhibit "C".

Sellers warrant and agree

that the lease represented by exhibits "B" and "C" annexed hereto
are in good standing and full force and effect under the terms
and conditions contained therein with no other modifications
thereto at this time.
19.

For a period of one year from date hereof buyers

agree to keep all of the assets of the corporation insured in
an amount sufficient to replace those items of personal property,
with a carrier satisfactory to seller, with seller named as an
additional named insured, and to furnish sellers with a certificate
of said insurance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, t h e p a r t i e s h e r e t o have e x e c u t e d
Stock P u r c h a s e Agreement t h e day and y e a r f i r s t
SELLERS:
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